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           NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1270 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
   
v. 
 
JUAN GORDON, 
   Appellant 
______________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00097-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
______________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2016 
 
Before:  JORDAN, VANASKIE, AND KRAUSE, Circuit Judges,  
 
(Opinion Filed: October 20, 2016) 
   
 
OPINION* 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Juan Gordon challenges the validity of a search warrant on the ground 
that the law enforcement officer who swore out the warrant provided the issuing judge 
with deliberately misleading information in the affidavit of probable cause.  On that 
basis, Gordon contends that the District Court erred in denying him a hearing pursuant to 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), so that he could further develop his claim that 
the evidence obtained from the search should have been suppressed.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm.   
I. Background 
 In connection with an ongoing investigation into heroin distribution in Western 
Pennsylvania, Detective Christopher Minton applied for a warrant to search Gordon’s 
person and car.  In support of his application, Detective Minton submitted an affidavit of 
probable cause in which he averred, among other things, that he received information 
from a reliable “confidential source” that an individual was selling heroin to Damon 
Agurs, a known heroin distributor; that he conducted surveillance based on tips from this 
source and observed Agurs meet briefly with an individual on two different occasions; 
and that, after pulling the individual’s car over, he was able to identify him as Appellant, 
Juan Gordon.  According to the affidavit, Detective Minton determined from Gordon’s 
criminal history that Gordon had multiple prior drug-related criminal convictions and was 
then on federal probation from a conviction for possession with intent to distribute 100 
grams or more of heroin.   
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 The affidavit further explained that, after receiving another tip from his 
“confidential source,” Detective Minton set up a surveillance team and watched as 
Gordon and Agurs drove around the block in Gordon’s car for approximately one minute 
before Gordon dropped Agurs off.  Immediately following this meeting with Gordon, 
according to the affidavit, Agurs began driving a separate car before a team of officers 
pulled him over.  During this stop, officers recovered 500 “stamp bags” of heroin from 
Agurs’ person.  At the same time Agurs was stopped, a different team of officers pulled 
over Gordon’s car and deployed a drug-sniffing dog, who gave a positive identification 
for drugs near the door where Gordon was driving.  The affidavit concluded by stating 
that, following these events, Gordon was detained and his car was “secured for a search 
warrant.”  
 On the basis of this affidavit, the reviewing judge agreed that there was probable 
cause to search Gordon’s person and car, and officers executing that warrant recovered a 
large quantity of cash and Gordon’s cell phone.  Gordon was later indicted on one count 
of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of 
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of possession with intent to 
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(C).   
 In connection with pre-trial motions and discovery, the Government informed 
Gordon’s counsel that the “confidential source” referred to in Detective Minton’s warrant 
affidavit was in fact another law enforcement officer who provided information based on 
a Title III wiretap.  Gordon then filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was entitled 
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to a so-called Franks hearing to examine Detective Minton and argue for suppression on 
the basis of the alleged material misrepresentations—i.e., that Gordon had made the 
necessary threshold showing (1) that Detective Minton’s references to a “confidential 
source” were intentionally or recklessly misleading, and (2) that those misrepresentations 
were material to the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 156 (1978). 
 The District Court disagreed and denied Gordon’s motion, concluding that even if 
Detective Minton’s statements were intentionally misleading, those statements were not 
material to a finding of probable cause. 1  Gordon now appeals.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction to review its final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s denial of a motion in support of a Franks hearing where, as here, 
the district court makes a probable cause ruling based on facts contained in a warrant 
affidavit.  United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 276 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States 
v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 
68, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Whether the untainted portions [of an affidavit] suffice to support 
                                              
 1 While the District Court did not issue any written findings in relation to 
Gordon’s motion to suppress or request for a Franks hearing, the record is sufficiently 
clear that we may “extract findings from [the court’s] oral decision at the hearing.”  In re 
Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 396 (3d Cir. 2006).  
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a probable cause finding is a legal question, and we review the district court’s ruling on 
that question de novo.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
III. Discussion 
 On appeal, Gordon argues that the District Court erred in two ways.  First, he 
contends that the District Court should have addressed both prongs of the Franks analysis 
and should not have denied him a hearing on the basis of materiality alone.  Second, he 
challenges the District Court’s conclusion that any misleading statements were 
immaterial to a finding of probable cause.  Both arguments are unavailing.  
 In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
entitles a criminal defendant to an opportunity to overcome the presumption of validity of 
an affidavit of probable cause by proving both (1) that the affidavit contained “a false 
statement [made] knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,” 
and (2) that once the allegedly false statement is removed, the remainder of the affidavit 
“is insufficient to establish probable cause.”  438 U.S. at 156.  In recognition of the 
countervailing interests in promoting finality and judicial efficiency, the Court 
established a two-step procedure for a defendant to prevail on a motion to suppress on the 
basis of an alleged false statement: first, the defendant must make a “substantial 
preliminary showing” with respect to both Franks elements to warrant a hearing, id. at 
155-56, and, second, at that hearing, the defendant must carry his ultimate burden of 
proving both elements, id. at 172.   
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 In view of this framework, we may dispose quickly of Gordon’s first argument, 
which appears to be that the District Court erred by assuming, instead of deciding, that 
the affidavit contained deliberate false statements before denying a Franks hearing on the 
ground that those statements were not material to the finding of probable cause.  There is 
simply no requirement in Franks that a district court decide both deliberate falsehood and 
materiality before denying a defendant a Franks hearing; rather, the burden is on the 
defendant to make the requisite preliminary showing that he can satisfy both prongs to be 
entitled to such a hearing.  Id. at 171-72.  Thus, if a district court determines the 
defendant has failed to make that showing with respect to either prong, there is no need 
for the court to proceed any further for the defendant then is not entitled to a hearing, 
much less suppression.2  Id.  That was the case here, and the District Court, having 
concluded that Gordon failed in any event to make the threshold showing as to 
materiality, did not err by declining to reach whether the statements in question were 
deliberately false.3   
                                              
 2 To the extent Gordon contends that even a “minor” misrepresentation warrants a 
Franks hearing, Appellant’s Br. 26, he misapprehends Franks’ holding that a defendant 
must first show that a misrepresentation is material before he is entitled to a hearing.  
 3 Gordon’s reliance on Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997), for the 
proposition that a district court must address both prongs of the Franks analysis, is 
misplaced.  In Sherwood, a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, appellees conceded that 
the affidavit in question was “partially false” and the first prong of the Franks test was 
satisfied.  Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 398.  Nevertheless, we affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment in their favor because the appellant had not shown that any 
misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit were material.  Id. at 402.  Thus, even if we 
accept Gordon’s contention that the facts in Sherwood are similar to the facts here, our 
analysis in Sherwood has no bearing on the instant case and, if anything, supports the 
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 Nor do we perceive any error in the District Court’s conclusion that the allegedly 
misleading statements in Detective Minton’s affidavit were immaterial to a finding of 
probable cause.  In order to satisfy the second prong of the Franks test, the defendant 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that once the false statement is excised, 
the remaining allegations set forth in the affidavit do not establish probable cause.  
United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 2006).  The question is whether after 
considering the “totality of the circumstances,” there is a “fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983).  This determination does not require “absolute certainty” that evidence 
of criminal activity will be uncovered, but only that it is “reasonable to assume” that the 
requested search will lead to the discovery of the sought-after evidence.  Yusuf, 461 F.3d 
at 390.  
 Considering the substance of the affidavit without reference to Detective Minton’s 
“confidential source,” we agree with the District Court that the combination of Gordon’s 
prior conviction for heroin distribution, Agurs’ reputation as a heroin dealer, the heroin 
discovered in Agurs’ pocket shortly after the one-minute ride around the block with 
Gordon in Gordon’s car, the drug sniffing dog’s positive identification for drugs on the 
driver’s side door of Gordon’s car, and Detective Minton’s personal observation of the 
two additional interactions between Gordon and Agurs, established a “fair probability” 
                                                                                                                                                  
Government’s position that Gordon’s claim is meritless because he cannot make the 
showing of materiality that Franks requires.  
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that evidence of heroin distribution would be discovered in a search of Gordon and his 
car.  Gordon thus did not make the “substantial preliminary showing” of materiality 
necessary to warrant a Franks hearing.  See United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 557, 
562 (3d Cir. 2010) (identifying the use of prior arrests or convictions for drug offenses 
and “activity evocative of drug dealing” as supportive of probable cause to search for 
evidence of a narcotics offense); cf. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013) 
(stating, in the context of a probable cause hearing regarding a drug dog’s reliability, that 
“[i]f the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs reliably in 
detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then the court should 
find probable cause”).  
 At certain points in his brief, Gordon characterizes Detective Minton’s reference 
to a “confidential source” as a misleading omission rather than as an affirmative 
misrepresentation, but that characterization only strengthens our conclusion that 
Detective Minton’s reference to a “confidential source” was not material.4  In the case of 
a misleading omission, as we recently observed, the proper course would be for the 
District Court to “identify any improperly . . . omitted facts” and “perform a word-by-
word reconstruction of the affidavit” to include those facts.  Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 
No. 15-1328, 2016 WL 4434400, at *7 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2016).  But here, as even 
                                              
 4 In his motion to the District Court, it appears that Gordon argued that Detective 
Minton’s reference to a “confidential source” was both a materially false statement and a 
material omission.  Thus, we reject the Government’s waiver argument, but nonetheless 
conclude that whether the statement is characterized as a misstatement or an omission 
does not affect the outcome of this case.  
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Gordon concedes, if a court were to reconstruct the affidavit to eliminate any mention of 
a “confidential source” and to state instead that Detective Minton’s source of information 
was another law enforcement official who had listened to a Title III wiretap, the evidence 
in support of probable cause would only be more reliable.  See Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 384-85 
(stating that “informants are not presumed to be credible” but “information received from 
other law enforcement officials during the course of an investigation is generally 
presumed to be reliable”).  In sum, whether viewed as an affirmative misstatement or as a 
misleading omission, Detective Minton’s reference to a “confidential source” was not 
material. 
 Gordon argues, nonetheless, that he is entitled to a Franks hearing because the 
District Court evaluated probable cause by considering not only the evidence set forth in 
Detective Minton’s affidavit, but also other information known to that Court as a result of 
the broader Title III investigation.  Nothing in the record supports that conclusion.  
Indeed, the statement by the District Court on which Gordon relies for this argument—
that the District Court “believe[d] that there was probable cause in the four corners of the 
warrant to search, even if one excludes the confidential informant’s last wiretap 
information”—is directly to the contrary.  Appellant’s Br. 18.  In any event, we have 
conducted a plenary review of the District Court’s determination as to materiality and 
also conclude that the factual allegations in the affidavit, even excluding the references to 
the “confidential source,” were sufficient to establish probable cause. 
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Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying 
Gordon’s motion to suppress.  
